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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN
ENGLERT, Husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
-vs-

Case No. 910490

HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTY G.
ZANE, husband and wife, and
JOHN A. McNEIL and KATHY
McNEIL, husband and wife,

Category No. 16

Defendants/Appellees.

ADDENDUM TO APPELLANTS1 BRIEF

Addendum to Appellants1 Brief containing the following items
1.

Trial Court's Memorandum Decision.

2.

Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

3.

Trial Court's Judgment.

Foremaster
Plaintiffs/Appellants
CERTIFICATE/OF SERVICE BY MAILING
I hereby certify I mailed /four copys of the above and foregoing
to Mr. Michael D. Hughes, Attorney at Law, 148 East Tabernacle, St.
George, Utah 84770 on this 21st day of January, 1992,
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IN THE PISTFICT CCUPT CF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL PISTFICT
IT! AND FCP WASFINCTON COUNTY, STATF OF UTAH
CHAFLES C. ENCLFPT and JO ANN
FNGLEPT, husband and wife,

]
1

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

1

vs.
HENPY E. ZANE and DOPOTHY C. ZANE,
husband and wife; and JOHN A, NcMEIL
and FATFIE McNEIL, husband and wife,
)

Civil No. 890502581

Defendants.

This matter came on for trial to the bench on October
24th & 26th, 1990, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding.

The

Plaintiffs, Charles C. and JoAnn Enclert were present and
represented by their attorney, Phillip L. Foremaster.

The

Defendants, Henry E. and Dorothy Zane and John A. and Kathie
McNeil were present and represented by their attorney, Michael D.
Hughes.

The Defendants had filed a Third Party Complaint naming

Pussell and Patricia Walter and the Lucky 7 Podeo Corporation, a
Utah corporation, as Third-party Defendants.

Mr. VJalter was

present and all Third-Party Defendants were represented by Gary W.
Pendleton, their attorney.

During the trial the Defendants/Third

Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party Defendants reached a
stipulated settlement of their dispute and upon stipulation of all

1.
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parties the Court dismissed the Third-Party Complaint,
^hereafter, Mr. Pendleton left and neither he nor those
represented by him participated further as parties.
The Court took evidence in the matter, viewed the
property in question at the request of the parties, and heard
arguments of counsel.
submission.

The matter was then taken under

The Court now renders the following Decision and

Judgment upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
FINDINGS OF FACT
In the mid-1960's, Russell and Patricia Walter owned a
tract of land north of the town of Veyo in Washington County,
Utah.

They decided to subdivide the land and in doing so

eventually created the Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision
(E.S.H.S.).

The property was surveyed by one Jack R. Newville, a

registered land surveyor and professional engineer.

The B.S.H.S.

plat was approved and recorded in the office of the Washington
County Recorder in mid-1965.

Thereafter, the lots were sold to

various buyers, primarily by Russell Walter.
The Washington County Assessor assessed

taxes on the

subdivided lots on the basis on the recorded subdivision plat.
Prior to survey, Fr. Walter instructed Mr. Newville that
he should lay out the subdivision , insofar as possible, to make

2.
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the Santa Clara Piver, which traverses the property, the common
boundary between the lots on each side.

It was Mr. Walter's

intention and design that the lots on both sides of the river have
title to the center line of the river.

After the subdivision map

was completed, it appeared that ™r. Walter's instructions had been
followed as there was a meanderinq border down the center of the
subdivision which Mr. Walters/ and everyone else, assumed followed
the course of the river.

The location of the river did not appear

on the subdivision plat.

There was no attempt to check on the

assumption regarding the river border until 1983 when the
Plaintiffs in this case commissioned a survey of Lots 12 and 13 in
preparation for purchase thereof.

The survey revealed that the

river was not on the boundary line between those lots and Lots 5,
6 and 7 which adjoined Lots 12 and 13 on the northwest.
As Mr. Walter sold the lots in his subdivision to
various buyers he informed each buyer whose lot appeared to abut
the river that they were in fact acquiring title to the center
line of the river and nothing on the other side of the river.
This v/as based on Mr. Walter's assumption that his instructions to
Mr. Newville had been followed.

Mr. Walter also inserted in all

but two deeds issued in the B.S.H.S. subdivision a reservation
which he intended to act as a guarantee that even if the course of
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the river changed the boundary line between the lots would change
with it.

The language of the reservation conveyed the property

"less any part crossing the Santa Clara Fiver".

This language was

contained in the deed issued to the first purchaser of Lot 13 and
to several others thereafter but was not included in the chain of
deeds to the purchasers of Lot 12.
In the first year or so after the subdivision was
recorded, Mr. Walter sold Lot 7 to Mr. and Mrs. Karr on a Real
Estate Sales Contract.

The Karrs immediately took possession and

began building a house on the lot which was completed by the end
of 1967 or the beginning of 1968.

In 1969, after the real estate

contract was paid off, Mr. Walter recorded a warranty deed
transferring title from the Lucky 7 Rodeo Corporation to the
Karrs.

The Karrs were told at the time that they purchased the

property that they owned the land up to the center of the river
and were actually taken to the property and shown survey stakes by
Mr. Walter which he said evidenced that boundary.

The Karrs

purchased the property after receiving those representations.
Immediately after signing the real estate contract the Karrs began
using the land to the river's edge for various recreational
pursuits, as a back yard, for access to the river and for the
maintenance of landscaping such as grasses and trees.

Some of the

plants in the area were natural and some imported and planted by

4.

the Karrs.

The area was kept groomed to the water's edge.

Mr.

Walter observed this use and testified that it continued for
several years after the Karrs took possession.
Within a short tine after the Karrs bought Lot 7, Mr.
and Mrs. Glenn Myers bought Lot 6, also on a land sales
agreement.

They also took possession of the property immediately

and placed a mobile home thereon.

The exact date that they

purchased the property or took possession was not established by
the evidence but the Karrs and the Myers were among the first
purchasers in the subdivision.

Title to Lot 7 was transferred by

warranty deed to the Myers in 1972 after they paid off their land
sales contract.

The county tax records indicate a mobile home

first appeared on the property in the 1970 assessment.

The Myers

were also told by Mr. Walter when they purchased that their land
extended to the center line of the river.

Sometime after their

purchase of the land, the Myers began using the property to the
water's edge much in the same way as the Karrs were doing.
The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
Lots 6 and 7 were used much in the same fashion through various
owners thereafter to the present title holders, Mr. and

5.

Mrs. Zane on Lot 7 and Mr. and Mrs. McNeil on Lot 6, the testimony
of Mr. Santa Maria notwithstanding.

The Court's onsight

inspection revealed that both the Zanes and the McNeils continue
to use the land in the same ways as did their predecessors.
The Washington County Assessor assumed that the river
was the boundary between Lots 5, 6 and 7 on one side and Lots 12
and 13 on the other but the taxes were assessed not on the
location of the river but on the location of the property lines as
shown on the subdivision plat recorded in the County Recorder's
Office.

The Court finds that no taxes for Lots 12 and 13 were

ever paid by the owners of Lots 6 and 7.
When these Plaintiffs commissioned the 1988 re-survey of
Lots 12 and 13, which lots they intended to acquire from one
Dorothy Wirtz, they discovered that the survey did not follow the
river as the boundary between Lots 12 and 13 on one the hand, and
Lots 5, 6 and 7 on the other.

Indeed the re-survey showed that

the Santa Clara River runs through Lots 12 and 13 and Lots 6 and 7
do not abut the river at all.

In addition, the re-survey showed

that the hones on Lots 6 and 7 were actually situated astride the
property boundaries.

The home built by Karrs on Lot 7 and now

occupied by the Zanes is actually partially on Lot 7 and partially
on Lot 12.

The home (mobile home with a permanent and fixed

6.

addition) placed by Kyers and now occupied by McNeils, is partly
on Lot 6, partly on Lot 12, and party on Lot 13.
Cn Pay 2, 1°89, the Englerts filed this suit alleging
encroachment and praying for removal of the encroaching
structures.

The defense answered and counterclaimed asserting

several affirmative defenses.
The Plaintiffs testified that in their opinion the
property north and west of the Santa Clara River had a value of
fifty cents per square foot.

They also testified that if the

Defendants were allowed to take a portion of the property north
and west of the Santa Clara River from Lots 12 and 13, any portion
remaining on that side of the river would be reduced in value by
one-half.

On the other hand, Mr. Walter testified on the basis of

his expertise regarding values in the subdivision and real
property generally in that area of Washington County that land
values have decreased about 20 per cent since the Plaintiffs
bought Lots 12 and 13 from Mrs. Wirtz at a total price of
$22,900.00 for both lots.

That purchase price equates to 25 cents

per square foot.
ANALYSIS
The Plaintiffs Complaint alleges encroachment by the
Defendants.

The law is settled that no person has the right to

erect buildings or other structures upon his own land so that any
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part thereof will extend beyond his boundaries onto the land of an
adjoining property owner. (1 Am Jur 2d, Section 118, page 769),
The predecessors in interest of the defendants in this matter have
clearly violated this rule of law.

That does not however end our

inquiry in the matter.
The Plaintiffs herein seek the equitable remedy of
ejectment of the Defendants.

They wish to have the Court order

the Defendants to remove the encroaching structures from Lots 12
and 13.

The Court is therefore constrained to consider the

peculiar equities of this case to determine whether the Plaintiffs
are entitled to this equitable relief.
This case presents some unusual circumstances.

It

appears that the subdivider of the property and all those who
bought in the subdivision up to the Plaintiffs simply assumed that
the. river constituted the boundary line between the various pieces
of property.

The subdivider so informed all of those to whom he

sold pieces of property.

In addition, the subdivider included

language in the deeds to Lots 5, 6, 7 and 13 which he intended to
assure that the property line would remain the center line of the
river .
It also appears that if the encroaching structures are
moved they would be destroyed, or severely damaged and that those
structures are valued at $80,000.00 to $85,000.00 each.

8.

These

structures appear to have been in place for less than 20 years in
the case of the McNeils and over 20 years in the case of the Zanes
prior to the filing of this lawsuit.

In addition, the survey plat

which established the actual property boundaries has been a matter
of public record in the Washington County Recorder's office for
over 24 years prior to the filing of the lawsuit.
There is no evidence before this Court that prior to
these Plaintiffs, anyone ever complained about the location of the
boundaries or questioned the location of the Defendants' homes.
All previous owners in the subdivision have assumed that the
boundary was the center line of the river, although a routine
survey would have shown the discrepency.
As the subdivision was actually laid out the river would
run through Lots 12 and 13 and divide those lots.

That would

leave small parcels of Lots 12 and 13 to the north and west of the
river which would not be suitable for construction of residences
and which would not be accessable from the main portion of those
lots without construction of a bridge at considerable expense in
view of the fact that the river often rises dramatically during
the runoff season.
The Plaintiffs have not undertaken construction of
improvements on Lots 12 and 13 and there remains on the southeast
side of the river sufficient area for the Plaintiffs to construct
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a residence as they testified they desired to do.

Both the

Plaintiffs1 and the Defendants' predecessors in interest purchased
their lots with the clear understanding that the center line of
the river was the boundary.

The subdivider and the County Tax

Assessor also have believed that such was the case and and have so
represented the situation to the property owners.

The Plaintiffs

were aware of the boundary dispute when they purchased Lots 12 and
12.
In weighing these equities the Court is convinced that
requiring removal of the encroaching structures would not do
equity.

The persons now possessing the residences did not

construct then, and did not know that they were encroaching on
adjoining properties at the time that they purchased the
property.

In addition, there is no evidence that the predecessors

in interest of these Plaintiffs ever raised an objection to the
construction of the encroaching structures and in fact it appears
that those predecessors bought their land with the understanding
that their land only extended to the center line of the river.
The Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiffs have an
adequate remedy at law since their loss can be compensated by
assessment of damages in their favor if in fact they are entitled
to any legal remedy at all.

Assessing damages and allowing the

encroachments to remain will not destroy or significantly hinder
the intended use and enjoyment of the property contemplated by the
Plaintiffs.

The Court then turns to the question of whether or not
the Plaintiffs are entitled to any remedy in face of the defenses
raised by the Defendants.

The Defendants have listed several

defenses in their Answer but have not briefed or asserted all of
them.

The defenses v/hich the Defendants have asserted are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Adverse possession;
Statute of limitations;
Boundary by acquiescence;
Boundary by agreement;
Prescriptive easement (profit a prendre).

The Court will address those defenses seriatum.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
The Defendants attempted to show through testimony of
the Washington County Assessor and his subordinates that they had
paid taxes for more than seven years on those portions of Lots 12
and fc13 north and west of the river.
their contention.

The evidence did not support

It is clear that the tax assessment was based

on the lots as shown on the public record.

The assessor did not

check the survey and was not aware that parts of Lots 12 and 13
were located north and west of the river.

The assessor made no

adjustment to the taxes for any of the lots on the basis that the
McNeils and the Zanes and their predecessors were occupying land
in Lots 12 and 13.

In short, there was no evidence presented

which would allow this Court to find that the owners of Lots 5 and
7 ever paid taxes on any portion of Lots 12 and 13.

11.

Adverse possession has been codified in Utah,

Section

78-12-12 U.C.A., 1953 as Amended, clearly provides that title by
adverse possession cannot be acquired without payment of ". . .
all taxes which have been levied and assessed upon such land
according to lav;".

The defense of adverse possession must fail

since there is no showing that the owners of Lots 5 and 7 ever
paid any taxes on any portions of Lots 12 and 13.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Defendants did not press this defense except to
briefly mention it as it relates to their claim of adverse
possession.

Since the adverse possession defense has failed it

follows that this defense must also fail.

In addition, Section

78-12-6 U.C.A. is inapplicable since the Defendants were "seized"
(legal title holders) of the disputed property within 7 years of
filing the suit.
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
The Utah Supreme Court has recently addressed Boundary
by Acquiescence on several occasions.

The most recent cases

re-establish four elements to be proven by the proponent:
1.
2.
3.

Occupation up to a visibile line marked by
monuments, fences or buildings;
Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary;
For a long period of time;

4.

By adjoining land owners.

(See Judd Family Limited Partnership v. Hutchings,
141 U.A.R. 8;

Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P. 2d 417).
12.

A review of the cases decided in Utah does not reveal
whether a river constitutes a sufficient monument of a boundary to
establish the above elements.

Other authorities have held,

however, that a river may be a sufficient monument to mark a
boundary.
"When relating to land, a monument is some
tangible landmark established to indicate a
boundary. Objects, to be ranked as monuments,
have been required to have certain physical
properties such as visibility, permanence
and stability, and definite location,
independent of measurements. Monuments are
of two kinds, natural and artificial. . ."
(See 11 C.J.S. Boundaries,Section 5, page 545).
"Natural monuments are objects permanent in
character which are found on the land as they
were placed by nature, such as • . . streams
and rivers.'1
(See 11 C.J.S. Boundaries, Section 6, page 546
and footnote 88, same page.)
[See also Ellery v. Pacific Lumber Co., 281
P. 428 (Cal.); Drake v. Russian River Land Co.;
103 P. 167 (Cal.); Goodson v. Fitzgerald,
90 S.W. 898 (Texas)]
Under the facts of this case this Court finds that the
Santa Clara River is a sufficient boundary monument.

It is clear

from the testimony of the subdivider that each lot owner who
purchased in the subdivision was told that the river was in fact
the boundary.

There is no evidence that the river has moved.

13.

The

river is certainly visible, permanent and stable, and has a
definite location.
The evidence clearly shows that the Defendants and their
predecessors in interest have occupied those portions of Lots 12
and 13 north and west of the river and abutting Lots 6 and 7 as
though the river were the boundary.
The next element is mutual acquiescence in the river as
a boundary.
The Court finds that no one ever questioned the river
being the boundary until 1988.

It appears that everyone living in

the subdivision assumed that the river was the boundary and
conducted themselves accordingly.

The prior owners of Lots 12 and

13 never disputed the Defendants1 occupation of the now disputed
portions of Lots 12 and 13 prior to these Plaintiffs, for a period
of some 23 years after the subdivision was created.

The doctrine

of 'boundary by acquiescence does not require an agreement between
adjoining landov/ners to establish a particular monument as a
boundary.

Rather it requires only that the adjoining owners treat

the monument as a boundary for the required time period.

This is

more akin to a prescriptive right than a contractual right. [See
Lav/ of Practical Location of Boundaries and the Need for an
Adverse Possession Remedy, Brigham Young University Law Review,

14.

1986, by James H. Backman, hereinafter P.Y.U. L.R. 1986. }

This

doctrine is founded on the policy ennunciated by the Supreme Court
when it said,
" . . . that the peace and good order of
society require that there be stability
• . . in the ownership and occupation of
lands . . . [B]cundary lines which have
been long established and accepted by
those who should be concerned should be
left undisturbed in order to leave at rest
matters which may have resulted in
controversy and litigation . . ."
[Olson v. Par!: Daughters Investment Co.,
511 P. 2d 145, 147 (1973) ]
It is not necessary that the boundary was established by
the parties, or their predecessors in interest as a result of a
dispute or uncertainty.

rstaker v. Ainsworth, supra.]

It appears therefore that the owners of Lots 12 and 13
on one side and Lots 6 and 7 on the other did acquiesce in the
river being the boundary line.
With regard to the third element, "for a long period of
time", the Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Hobson v.
Panguitch Lake Corporation, 530 P. 2d, 792, page 795, as follows:
"But the opinion reaffirms the view that there
must be some substantial long period of time
and states that it is generally related to the
common-law prescriptive easement period of
20 years; and only under unusual circumstances
would a lesser period be deemed sufficient."
15.

It is clear that acquiescence in the boundary by
adjoining property owners must span at least 20 years absent
unusual circumstances.

In the case of the Zanes, v/hose original

predecessors in interest were the Karrs, it is clear that the time
requirements for boundary by acouiescence have been met.

In the

case of the McNeils, who traced their interests to the original
purchasers, the Myers, there is some question as to the length of
time that the acquiescence has been ongoing.

The evidence is

clear with regard to Lot 7 that it has been occupied by the Zanes
or their predecessors in interest at least since early 1968, as
has that portion of Lot 12 north and west of the Santa Clara ^iver.
However, the evidence does not establish when Lot 6 and
the portions of Lots 12 and 13, which are north and west of the
river and abut Lot 6, were occupied by the McNeils1 predecessors
in interest.

The McNeils have failed to carry their burden of

proof on that point.

This Court must find, therefore, that

although the McNeils are now occupying up the the riverfs edge and
have been doing so for a considerable period, there is
insufficient evidence to establish that they have been doing so
for at least 20 years.
Therefore, the third element of boundary by acquiescence
has been shown as to defendants Zane but not as to defendants
McNeil.

16.

The fourth element, "by adjoining landowners" is obvious
and has been established.
The Court therefore finds that defendants Zane are
entitled to a judgment quieting title in them to that parcel
identified as parcel A on Plaintiff's Exhibit #3 under the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

Defendants McNeil are not

so entitled.
BPHNDAPY BY AOPFEMENT
Boundary by Agreement reauires:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

An agreement,
between adjoining landowners.
Settling a boundary that was uncertain or
in dispute,
executed by actual location of a boundary
line,
mutual acquiescence for a long period of
time.

(See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P. 2d 417, footnote 4,
page 423; B.Y.U. L.R. 1°36, page 963.)
Boundary by Agreement is premised on a contract theory.
The rationale is that the parties, discovering that they had an
uncertain or disputed boundary, would get together and settle the
matter by agreement, locate an actual boundary line between them,
and mutually honor that boundary for a long period of time (20
years or more). The facts in this case do not support boundary by
agreement.

Until the 1988 survey commissioned by the Plaintiffs

17.

herein none of the lot owners was aware that there was an
uncertainty or dispute as to the boundary line.

Thereafter there

was never any agreement establishing a boundary line.

Boundary by

agreement does not apply under these facts.
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT (Profit a Prendre)
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Anderson v.
Osguthorpe, 504 P. 2d 1000 (1972), Justice Ellott discussed the
establishment of a prescriptive easement in the nature of profit a
prendre.

It appears that the elements which must be shown by the

proponent of such an easement are as follows:
1.
2.
3.

Exclusive use of the disputed land
for over 20 years
with use thereof being open and notorious,
continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and
under claim of right.

This Court finds from the evidence that the Zanes have
met the requirements to establish a prescriptive easement over the
disputed portions of Lot 12.

The evidence clearly demonstrates

that the Defendants Zane and their predecessors in interest
exercised exclusive use of the property upon which their home is
situated and behind that home up to the edge of the river from the
time that they purchased the property and took possession of it, a
period of over 20 years.

It is likewise clear from the facts that

18.

the use cf the property by the Defendants Zane herein was open and
notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse and under claim of
right, versus the owners of Lot 12 and was under a claim of right
based on the representations made to the original buyers by the
subdivider .
However, for the reasons set out hereinabove in
analyzing boundary by acquiescence, this Court finds that the
Defendants McNeil have failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that their use of the disputed portions of Lots 12 and 13
abutting Lot 6 has continued for the required 20 years.

Therefore

that use has not ripened into a prescriptive easement.
This Court therefore finds that if the Defendants Zane
had not acquired title to the property under the doctrine of
boundary of acquiescence they would have acquired a prescriptive
easement to use the property as it is now being used and has been
used historically.

In view of such a right to use the property

the Plaintiffs herein are entitled to no av/ard of damages against
Defendants Zane.
The Defendants McNeil are not entitled to a prescriptive
easement.
ESTOPPEL
Defendants raised estoppel as an affirmative defense in
their Answer but did not assert that defense during trial.

For

purposes of resolving all possible legal issues, however, the
Court will discuss estoppel as it applies to this case.

The elements of boundary by estoppel are:
1.

Representations by the true owner that
the mutually accepted line is the
true boundary;
2. reasonable reliance by the neighbor on
those representations;
3. substantial costs detrimentally incurred
by the neighbor, and
4. true owner knows that his representations
are erroneous or was grossly negligent
in making the representations.
(See B.Y.U. L.P, 1986, page 968)
In the case before this Court it appears that all the

eler.ents are met except the last.

There is no evidence that the

original owner, Mr. VJalter, knew that the river was not the
boundary.

Likewise, there is no evidence he was grossly negligent

in making that representation to his buyers in view of his
instructions to the surveyor and the appearance of the E.S.K.S.
plat map with the boundary line seeming to track the river.
Boundary by estoppel in not made out.
DAMAGES
The Court now turns to the issue of damages to be
assessed against Defendants McNeil for their wrongful encroachment
on Lots 12 and 13 and their wrongful possession and use of parcels
B & C as shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.
Upon stipulation, the parties agreed that parcel B
contains 5,401.84 square feet and parcel C contains 7,396.42
square feet.

The total of those parcels is therefore 12,798.26

square feet, which the Court will round down to 12,798\00.

20.

Plaintiffs purchased Lots 12 and 13 together at a total cost of
£22,900.00, or about 25 cents per square foot.

Plaintiffs contend

that the property has doubled in value and cite as proof certain
"comparable sales'1 in the area.

The Court can accord no weight to

those "comparable sales" since Plaintiffs candidly admitted they
had never seen these properties and had no idea how they actually
compared to the property in dispute, including whether they had
been improved.
Cn the other hand Defendants offered the testimony of
Mr. Walter who opined that the value of E.S.K.S. property has
declined 20 percent since the Plaintiffs purchase in 1988.

No

supporting evidence was offered for Mr. Walter's opinion.
The Court finds that the best indicator of the value of
the property is the amount Plaintiff's paid when they purchased in
1988, or 25 cents per square foot.
SUMMARY
Plaintiffs are therefore awarded judgment against
Defendants McNeil in the amount of $3,199.50 plus interest at 10%
from May 2, 1989 to date of trial, October 26, 1990, plus costs
and interest on the entire judgment at 12% per annum simple
interest from October 26, 1990, until paid in full.

Title to the

portions of Lots 12 and 13 designated as parcels B and C is then
awarded to Defendants McNeil.

21.

Defendants Zane are awarded title to that portion of Lot
12 designated as parcel A.

No damages are

assessed.

No attorney fees are awarded to either side.

Counsel

for Plaintiffs is to prepare an appropriate Judgment.

ctrt
DATED this

( ~~

day of November, 1990.

PHILIP E W S
fth District Judge

22.
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day of

, a true and correct copy of the

above and foregoing was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, or
hand-delivered, to:

Phillip L. Foremaster, Esq.
P. 0. Box 572
St. George, UT 84771

Michael D. Hughes, Esq,
148 East Tabernalce
St. George, UT 84770

Gary V7. Pendleton, Esq.
150 North 200 East, Suite #202
St. George, UT 84770
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN
ENGLERT, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

-vsHENRY E. ZANE and DOROTHY
G. ZANE, husband and wife; and
JOHN A. McNEIL and KATHIE
McNEIL, husband and wife,

Civil No. 890502581

Defendants.

This matter coming on for trial on October 24 and October 26,
1990 before the Court sitting without a jury and the Plaintiffs being
present and being represented by their attorney Phillip L. Foremaster
and the Defendants being present and being represented by their attorney
Michael D. Hughes and the Third-Party Defendant being present and
being represented by his attorney Gary W. Pendleton and during the
course of the trial a stipulation and agreement having been made
between the Third-Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party Defendant
and he having been thereupon dismissed from the lawsuit and the
remaining parties having presented testimony and evidence in support
of their respective positions and the Court being fully advised in
the premises now finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That in the mid-1960fs Russell and Patricia Walter owned

and created thereon a subdivision known under the name and style
of Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision (B.S.H.S.).

The subject

property was surveyed by one Jack R. Newville, a registered land
surveyor and professional engineer and the B.S.H.S. subdivision plat
was approved and recorded in the Office of the Washington County,
Utah recorder in mid-1965. Thereafter the subdivision lots were
solde to various buyers, primarily by Russell Walter.
2.

Since the recording of the B.S.H.S. Subdivision Plat the

Washington County, Utah Assessor has assessed taxes on the subdivided
lots on the basis of the information contained on the recorded
subdivision plat.
3.

Prior to the survey Mr. Walter instructed Mr. Newville that

he should lay out the subdivision, insofar as possible, to make the
Santa Clara River, which traverses the property, the common
boundary between the lots on each side.

It was Mr. Walter's intention

and design that the lots on both sides of the river have title to
the center line of the river. After the subdivision map was completed,
it appeared that Mr. Walter's instructions had been followed as there
was a meandering border down the center of the subdivision which
Mr. Walter, and everyone else, assumed followed the course of the
river.

The location of the river did not appear on the subdivision

plat.

There was not attempt to check on the assumption regarding

the river border until 1988 when the Plaintiffs in this case commissioned a survey of Lots 12 and 13 in preparation for the purchase
thereof.

The survey revealed that the river was not on the boundary

line between those lots and Lots 5, 6 and 7 which adjoin Lots 12
and 13 on the Northwest.
4.

As Mr. Walter sold the lots in his subdivision to various

buyers he informed each buyer whose lots appeared to abut the river

river and nothing on the other side of the river.

This was based

upon Mr. Walter's assumption that his instructions to Mr. Newville
had been followed.

Mr. Walter also inserted in all but two deeds

issued in the B.S.H.S. Subdivision a reservation which he intended
to act as a guarantee that even if the course of the river changed
the boundary line between the lots would change with it. The
language of the reservation conveyed the property "less any part
crossing the Santa Clara River'1.

This language was contained in

the deed issued to the first purchaser of Lot 13 and to several others
thereafter but was not included in the chain of deeds to the purchasers of Lot 12.
5.

The Court finds that the reservation in the deeds was based

on the presumption set forth in paragraph four above, which presumption was a mistake; as such, the reservation is ineffective and a
nullity.
6.

In the first year or so after the subdivision was recorded,

Mr. Walter sold Lot 7 to Mr. and Mrs. Karr on a Real Estate Contract.
The Karrs immediately took possession and began building a house
on the lot which was completed by the end of 1967 or the beginning
of 1968.

In 1969, after the real estate contract was paid off, Mr.

Walter recorded a Warranty Deed transferring title from the Lucky
7 Rodeo Corporation to the Karrs. The Karrs were told at the time
that they purchased the property that they owned the land up to the
center of the river and were actually taken to the property and shown
survey stakes by Mr. Walter which he said evidenced that boundary.
The Karrs purchased the property after receiving those representations,
Immediately after signing the real estate contract the Karrs began
using the land to the river's edge for various recreational pursuits,
as a back yard, for access to the river and for the maintenance of
landscaping such as grasses and trees.

Some of the plants in the

area was kept groomed to the waterrs edge. Mr. Walter observed this
use and testified that it continued for several years after the Karrs
took possession.
7.

Within a short time after the Karrs bought Lot 7, Mr. and

Mrs. Glenn Myers bought Lot 6, also on a land sales agreement.

They

also took possession of the property immediately and placed a mobile
home thereon.

The exact date that they purchased the property or

took possession was not established by the evidence but the Karrs
and the Myers were mong the first purchasers in the subdivision.
Title to Lot 6 was transferred by warranty deed to the Myers in 1972
after the ypaid off their land sales contract.

The county tax records

indicate a mobile home first appeared on the property in the 1970
assessment.

The Myers were also told by Mr. Walter when they purchased

that their land extended to the center line of the river.

Sometime

after their purchase of the land, the Myers began using the property
to the water! s edge much in the same way as the Karrs were doing.
8.

The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that

Lots 6 and 7 were used much in the same fashion through various owners
thereafter to the present title holders, Mr. and Mrs. Zane on Lot
7 and Mr. and Mrs. McNeil on Lot 6, the testimony of Mr. Santa Maria
notwithstanding.

The Court's onsight inspection revealed that both

the Zanes and the McNeils continue to use the land in teh same ways
as did their predecessors.
9.

The Washington county Assessor assumed that the river was

the boundary between Lots 5,6 and 7 on the one side and Lots 12 and
13 pn the other but the taxes were assessed not on the locaton of
the river but on the location of the property lines as shown on the
subdivison plat recorded in the County Recorder's Office. The Court
finds that no taxes for Lots 12 and 13 were ever paid by the owners

10.

When these Plaintiffs commissioned the 1988 re-survey of

Lots 12 and 13, which lots they intended to acquire from one Dorothy
Wirtz, they discovered that the survey did not follow the river as
boundary between Lots 12 and 13 on the one hand, and Lots 5,6 and
7 on the other.

Indeed the re-survey showed that the Santa Clara

River runs through Lots 12 and 13 and Lots 6 and 7 do not abut the
river at all.

In addition, the re-survey showed that the homes on

Lots 6 and 7 were actually situated astride the property boundaries.
The home built by the Karrs on Lot 7 and now occupied by the Zanes
is actually partially on Lot 7 and partially on Lot 12.

The home

(mobile home with a permanent and fixed addition) placed by Myers
and now occupied by McNeils, is partly on Lot 6, partly on Lot 12
and partly on Lot 13.
11.

On May 2, 1989 the Englerts filed this suit alleging

encroachment and praying for removal of the encroaching structures.
The defense answered and counterclaimed asserting several affirmative
defenses.
12.

The plaintiffs testified that in their opinion the property

north and west of the Santa Clara River had a value of fifty cents
per square foot.

They also testified that if the defendants were

allowed to take a portion of the property north and west of the Sana
Clara River from Lots 12 and 13, any portion remaining on that side
of the river would be reduced in value by one-half.

On the other

hand, Mr. Walter testified on the basis of his expertise regarding
values in the subdivison and real property generally in that area
of Washington County that land values have decreased about 20 per
cent since the Plaintiffs bought Lots 12 and 13 from Mrs. Wirtz at
a total price of $22,900.00 for both lots.

That purchase price

equates to 25 cents per square foot.
13.

The Plaintiff's complaint alleges encroachment hv rha

Defendants.

The law is settled that no person has the right to

erect buildings or other structures upon his own land so that any
part thereof will extend beyond his boundaries onto the land of an
adjoining property owner.
14.

The Court finds that the predecessors in interst of the

Defendants in this matter have clearly violated this rule.
15.

The Plaintiffs herein seek the equitable remedy of ejectment

of the Defendant.

They wish to have the Court order the Defendants

to remove the encroaching structures from Lots 12 and 13.

The Court

is therefore constrained to consider the peculiar equities of this
case to determine whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to this equitable
relief.
16.

This case presents some unusual circumstances.

It appears

that the subdivider of the property and all those who bought in the
subdivision up to the Plaintiffs simply assumed that the river
constituted the boundary line between the various pieces of property.
The subdivider so informed all of those to whom he sold pieces of
property.

In addition, the subdivider included language in the deeds

to \Lots 5, 6,7 and 13 which he intended to assure that the property
line would remain the center line of the river.
17.

It also appears that if the encroaching structures are

moved they would be destroyed, or severely damaged and that those
structures are valued at $80,000.00 to $85,000.00 each.

These

structures appear to have been in place for less than 20 years in
the case of the McNeils and over 20 years in the case of the Zanes
prior to the filing of this lawsuit.

In addition, the survey plat

which established the actual property boundaries has been a matter
of public record in the Washington County Recorder1s Office for over
24 years prior to the filing of the lawsuit.
18.

There is no evidence hpfnrp t-h-ic r™i-v-+- +-u~+- —-•--- -

Plaintiffs anyone ever complained about the location of the boundaries or questioned the location of the Defendants' homes. All
previous owners in the subdivison have assumed that the boundary
was the center line of the river, althougha routine survey would
have shown the discrepency.
19.

As the subdivision was actually laid out the river would

run through Lots 12 and 13 and divide those lots.

That would leave

small parcels of lots 12 and 13 to the north and west of the river
which would not be suitable for construction of residences and which
would not be accessable from the main portion of those lots without
construction of a bridge at considerable expense in view of the fact
that the river often rises dramatically during the runoff season.
20.

The Plaintiffs have not undertaken construction of impove-

ments on Lots 12 and 13 and there remains on the Southeast side of
the river sufficient area for the Plaintiffs to construct a residence
as they testified they desired to do.

Both the Plaintiffs and the

Defendants' predecessors in interest purchased their lots with the
clear understanding that the center line of the river was the boundary*.

The subdivider and the County tax Assessor also have believed

that such was the case and have so represented the situation to the
property owners.

The Plaintiffs were aware of the boundary dispute

when the purchased Lots 12 and 13.
21.

In weighing these equities the Court is convinced that

requiring the removal of the encroaching structures would not do
equity.

The persons now possession the residences did not construct

them, and did not know that they were encroaching on adjoining
properties at the time that they purchased the property.

In addition,

these is not evidence that the predecessors in interest of these
Plaintiffs ever raised an objection to the construction of the encroaching structures and in f^rt- -ft- a^-~~~ *-t--- -•»

bought their land with the understanding that their land only extended
to the center line of the river.
22.

The Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiffs have an

adequate remedy at law since their loss can be compensated by
assessment of damages in their favor. Assessing damages and allowing
the encroachments to remain will not destroy or significantly hinder
the intended use and enjoyment of the property contemplated by the
Plaintiffs.
23.

There is no evidence before the Court that either the Def-

endants or their predecessors in interest ever paid any taxes on
Lots 12 and 13 of the subject subdivision.

Therefore Adverse

Possession is not applicable.
24.

Under the facts of this case the Court finds that the

Santa Clara River is a sufficient boundary monument for applicaiton
of the doctrine of Boundary Line by Acquiescence.

It is clear from

the testimony of the subdivider that each lot owner who purchased
in the subdivison was told that the river was in fact the boundary.
There is not evidence that the river has moved.

The river is certainly

visible, permanent and stable, and has a definite location.
25.

The evidence clearly shows that the Defendants and their

predecessors in interest have occupied those portions of Lots 12
and 13 north and west of the river and abutting Lots 6 and 7 as thought
the river were the boundary.
26.

The Court finds that no one ever questioned the river being

the bvoundary until 1988.

It appears that everyone living in the

subdivison assumed that the river was the boundary and conducted
themselves accordingly.

The prior owners of Lots 12 and 13 never

disputed the Defendants1 occupation of the now disputed portions
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of Lots 12 and 13 prior to these Plaintiffs, for a period of some
23 years after the subdivision was created. The doctrine of boundary

by acquiescence does not require an agreement between adjoining landowners to establish a particular monument as a boundary.

Rather

it requires only that the adjoining owners treat the monument as
a boundary for the required time period.

This is more akin to a

prescriptive right than a contractual right.
27.

It appears therefore that the owners of Lots 12 and 13

on one side and Lots 6 and 7 on the other did acquiesce in the river
being the boundary line.
28.

It is clear that acquiescence in the boundary by adjoining

property owners must span at least 20 years absent unusual circumstances.

In the case of the Zanes, whose original predecessors in

interest were the Karrs, it is clear that the time requirements for
boundary by acquiescence have been met.

In the case of the McNeils

who traced their interests to the original purchasers, the Myers,
there is some question as to the length of time that acquiescence
has been ongoing.

The evidence is clear with regard to Lot 7 that

it has been occupied by the Zanes or their predecessors in interest
at least since early 1968, as has that portion of Lot 12 north and
west of the Santa Clara River.
29.

The Evidence does not establish when Lot 6 and the portions

of Lots 12 and 13, which are north and west of the river and abut
Lot 6, were occupied by the McNeils1 prececessors in interest.

The

Mcneils have failed to carry their burden of proof on that point.
This Court must find, therefore, that although the McNeils are now
occupying up to the river1s edge and have been doing so for a considerable period, there is insufficient evidence to establish that
they have been doing so for at least 20 years.
30.

The Defendants Zane are entitled to judgment of the Court

quieting title in them under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
in and to the following described real nrnnprt-v 1 ^ ^ ^

-,••« TT~-U,--~O- —

County, State of Utah, to-wit:

Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 7, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running thence South parallel with the East
boundary line of lot 12 of said subdivison to the center of the Santa
Clara River; thence easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara
River to the East lot line of said Lot 12; thence Northerly along
said east boundary line of said lot 12 to the Northeast corner of
said Lot 12; thence Westerly along the Northerly Boundary Line of
said Lot 12 to the point of beginning.
31.

The Defendants McNeil, having failed to establish a suffi-

cient length of holding for boundary line by acquiescence are not
entitled to any order quieting title to them in any of the involved
real property.
32.

The Defendants raised as a defense to the Plaintiffs1

Complaint the defense of Boundary By Agreement however the Court
finds no such agreement and therefore no merit in such defense.
33.

In addition to the aforesaid findings the Court finds that

the Defendants Zane have showing sufficient evidence to establish
a prescriptive easement in the above entitled real property however
the Defendants McNeil have failed to meet their burden of proof to
support such a claim.
34.

The Defendants McNeil have encroached upon the following

described real property located in Washington County, Utah and
belonging to the Plaintiffs said encroachment being wrongful, said
property being described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running Southerly parallel with the East boundary
line of Lot 13 of said Subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara
River; thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River
to the East boundary line of said Lot 13; thence Northerly along
the East boundary line of said lot 13 to the Northeast Corner of
said Lot 13; thence Westerly along the North boundary line of said
Lot 13 to the point of beginning.
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Lot 6, Brookside bummer Homes
Subdivision and run thence Southerly parallel with the West
boundry line of lot 12 of said subdivision to the center of the Santa
Clark River; thence Westerly along the center line of said Santa
Clara River to the West boundary line of said lot 12: t-hpnrp Nnr^oriw

of said Lot 12.; thence Easterly along the North boundary line of
said Lot 12 to the point of beginning.
35.

As a result of said encroachment the Plaintiffs are

entitled to be paid damages for the loss of their property because
of such encroachment in the amount of 25 cents per square foot so
taken which amount the Court finds as being the fair market value
for said property so taken.
36.

That according to stipulation of the parties, the total

square feet taken by said encroachments, described at trial as Parcels
B and C and referenced in Findings of Fact No. 34, supra, is 12,798
square feet.

That as a result the amount of damage is 25 cents

multiplied by 12,798 or $3199,50 plus interest at 10 per cent per
annum from May 2, 1989 to date of trial of October 26, 1990 plus
costs and interest on the entire judgment at 12 per cent per annum
from October 26, 1990 until paid in full.
37.

That as soon as judgment is paid the Defendants McNeil

are entitled to have awarded to them title to the property described
in Finding numbesr 34 above.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As Conclusions of Law from the foregoing Findins of Fact the
Court concludes as follows:
• 1.

That the Defendants Zane are entitled to an order of this

Court quieting title in them and against Plaintiffs to the real property located in Washington County, Utah and particularly described
in Finding number 30 above.
2.

That the Plaintiffs are entitled to Judgment against the

Defendants McNeil in the principal sum of $3199.50 together with
interest thereron from May 2, 1989 to October 26, 1990 plus costs
and interest on the entire Judgment at 12 per cent per annum from
October 26, 1990 until paid in full.
3.

That upon payment of said Judgment the DpfpnHant-c M^IST^-M

are entitled to have awarded to them title to the property described
in Finding number 34 above.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated this

j 0— day ofUtSy, 1991.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN
ENGLERT, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT
-vs-

Civil No. 890502581

HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTHY
G. ZANE, husband and wife; and
JOHN A. McNEIL and KATHY
McNEIL, husband and wife,
Defendants.

This matter coming on for trial on October 24 and October 26,
1990 before the Court sitting without a jury and the Plaintiffs being
present and being represented by their attorney Phillip L. Foremaster
and the Defendants and Third-party Plaintiffs being represented by
their attorney Michael D. Hughes and the Third Party Defendant being
present and being represented by his attorney Gary W. Pendleton and
during the course of the trial a stipulation and agreement havinf
^v been made between the Third-Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party
.y Defendants and said Third-party Defendant having been thereupon
sf

dismissed from the lawsuit and the parties having presented certain
testimony and exhibits and the Court having been fully advised in

(

the premises and having caused to be entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and ordered judgment in accordance therewith;.,*
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED i-hat-

County, State of Utah is hereby quieted in the Defendants Henry E.
Zane and Dorothy G. Zane, husband and wife, and against the Plaintiffs,
said real property being particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 7, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running thence South parallel with the East Boundary
Line of Lot 12 of said subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara
River; thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River
to the East lot line of said Lot 12; thence Northerly along said
East Boundary Line of said Lot 12 to the Northeast Corner of said
Lot 12; thence Westerly along the Northerly Boundary Line of said
Lot 12 to the point of beginning.
It is further ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Charles C. Englert
and Jo Ann Englert do have judgment against the Defendants John A.
McNeil and Kathie McNeil, husband and wife in the principal sum of
$3199.50 together with interest thereon at the rate of 10 per cent
per annum from May 12, 1989 to October 26, 1990 in the amount of
$466.91, making a total Judgment of $3666.41 together with costs
and interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from October
26, 1990 until paid in full.
It is further ORDERED that upon payment of said Judgment title
to the following described real property located in Washington
County, Utah shall be awarded to the Defendants John A. McNeil and
Kathie McNeil, said property being described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running thence parallel with the East Boundary Line
of Lot 13 of said Subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara River;
thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River to
the East Boundary Line of said Lot 13; thence Northerly along the
East boundary line of said Lot 13 to the Northeast Corner of said
Lot 13; thence Westerly along the North Boundary Line of said Lot
13 to the point of beginning.
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running thence Southerly parallel with the West
Boundary Line of Lot 12 of said Subdivision to the center of the
Santa Clara River; thence Westerly along the center line of said
Santa Clara River to the West Boundary Line of said Lot 12; thence
Northerly along the West Boundary Line of said Lot 12 to the Northwest
Corner of said Lot 12; thence Easterly along the North Boundary Line

of said Lot 12 to the nnitu- n f u •
i-u Lne point of beginning,
Dated this JO^
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN
ENGLERT, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT
-vsCivil No. 890502581
HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTHY
G. ZANE, husband and wife; and
JOHN A. McNEIL and KATHY
McNEIL, husband and wife,
Defendants.

This matter coming on for trial on October 24 and October 26,
1990 before the Court sitting without a jury and the Plaintiffs being
present and being represented by their attorney Phillip L. Foremaster
and the Defendants and Third-party Plaintiffs being represented by
their attorney Michael D. Hughes and the Third Party Defendant being
present and being represented by his attorney Gary W. Pendleton and
during the course of the trial a stipulation and agreement havinf
^v been made between the Third-Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party
.y Defendants and said Third-party Defendant having been thereupon
V

dismissed from the lawsuit and the parties having presented certain
testimony and exhibits and the Court having been fully advised in

^
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the premises and having caused to be entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and ordered judgment in accordance therewith; ,,
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that

County, State of Utah is hereby quieted in the Defendants Henry E.
Zane and Dorothy G. Zane, husband and wife, and against the Plaintiffs,
said real property being particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 7, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running thence South parallel with the East Boundary
Line of Lot 12 of said subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara
River; thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River
to the East lot line of said Lot 12; thence Northerly along said
East Boundary Line of said Lot 12 to the Northeast Corner of said
Lot 12; thence Westerly along the Northerly Boundary Line of said
Lot 12 to the point of beginning.
It is further ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Charles C. Englert
and Jo Ann Englert do have judgment against the Defendants John A.
McNeil and Kathie McNeil, husband and wife in the principal sum of
$3199-50 together with interest thereon at the rate of 10 per cent
per annum from May 12, 1989 to October 26, 1990 in the amount of
$466.91, making a total Judgment of $3666.41 together with costs
and interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from October
26, 1990 until paid in full.
It is further ORDERED that upon payment of said Judgment title
to the following described real property located in Washington
County, Utah shall be awarded to the Defendants John A. McNeil and
Kathie McNeil, said property being described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running thence parallel with the East Boundary Line
of Lot 13 of said Subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara River;
thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River to
the East Boundary Line of said Lot 13; thence Northerly along the
East boundary line of said Lot 13 to the Northeast Corner of said
Lot 13; thence Westerly along the North Boundary Line of said Lot
13 to the point of beginning.
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes
Subdivision and running thence Southerly parallel with the West
Boundary Line of Lot 12 of said Subdivision to the center of the
Santa Clara River; thence Westerly along the center line of said
Santa Clara River to the West Boundary Line of said Lot 12; thence
Northerly along the West Boundary Line of said Lot 12 to the Northwest
Corner of said Lot 12; thence Easterly along the North Boundary Line

of said Lot 12 to the point of beginning,
Dated this

/C&

day of "25^1991.
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